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THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT IN
GAY RIGHTS CASES
Nan D. Hunter*
INTRODUCTION
The argument that laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation in fact discriminate on the basis of sex is not new.
Advocates have been pressing this claim for almost thirty years.
Simply put, the argument is that a statute that bars a sexual
relationship between two women or two men discriminates on the
basis of sex because either partner could have had the same
relationship with a person of the opposite sex.
The beginning was not auspicious for the sex discrimination
argument. Courts considering challenges in the 1970s to marriage
laws concluded, with very little need for discussion, that marriage
was definitionally an institution involving only male-female
couples, and that therefore even a state Equal Rights Amendment
could not undo the prohibition on same-sex marriage.' Similarly,
courts hearing employment discrimination cases easily concluded
that sex discrimination meant discrimination against women or
occasionally against men, but not anti-gay discrimination.2
That easy dismissal of the sex discrimination argument has
begun to erode. The first judicial adoption of this argument came
in 1993 in Baehr v. Lewin, in which the Hawaii Supreme Court
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Chris Fowler for his
assistance with research and editing.
' See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson,
191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.
1974). Accord Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
2 See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979);
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
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held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples did constitute
a prima facie case of violating that state's Equal Rights Amend-
ment.3 In 1999, it was taken up and expanded by Justice Johnson
as part of the basis for her concurrence in Baker v. Vermont,
holding that the Vermont marriage statute violated that state's
constitution.4 Most recently, the Texas Court of Appeals invalidat-
ed a same-sex sodomy statute on that ground as well.'
The sex discrimination argument has also begun to gain traction
in sexual orientation cases arising under statutes. The Supreme
Court has ruled that same-sex harassment claims are justiciable
under Title VII,6 in response to same-sex sexual harassment
complainants who have sought to frame the allegedly unlawful
conduct as sex discrimination, either rather than or in addition to
sexual orientation discrimination.7 Similarly, under Title IX, same-
sex harassment has been recognized as a subset of sex discrimina-
tion.8 For example, the Wisconsin state anti-discrimination statute
' 852 P.2d 44, 81-82 (Haw.), recons. granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993).
4 744 A.2d 864, 898 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring).
' Lawrence v. Texas, No. 14-99-00109-CR, 2000 WL 729417 (Tex. App.,
June 8, 2000).
6 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see also
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143-44 (4th Cir. 1996)
(allowing a Title VII claim to proceed where the male plaintiff alleged
discrimination by his allegedly homosexual supervisor not because of the
plaintiffs heterosexual orientation, but because he was male).
7 See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v.
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe v.
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989).
8 See Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (D. Minn.
2000); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal.
2000); see also Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12036 (Mar.
13, 1997) ("The Guidance has been clarified to indicate that if harassment is
based on conduct of a sexual nature, it may be sexual harassment prohibited by
Title IX even if the harasser and the harassed are the same sex or the victim of
harassment is gay or lesbian."). In Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir.
1996), the court found that a school district discriminated on the basis of sex in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause when it failed to protect a gay student
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includes sexual orientation within its definition of sex discrimina-
tion,9 and an Oregon court interpreted that state's law against sex
discrimination to encompass a challenge to the denial of health
insurance benefits to the partners of lesbian and gay state employ-
ees.' o One court outside the United States has invalidated a sexual
orientation classification on the ground that it constituted sex
discrimination under an international covenant." But beyond the
principle that one can state a prima facie claim in such cases, there
is no clarity as to what relationship exists between sex equality law
and sexual orientation claims
It is time to pay more attention to this cluster of arguments.
Other writers have explored the advantages and disadvantages of
the sex discrimination argument for the goal of advancing lesbian
and gay rights law.12 Instead, I would like to try to fill what I see
as an unfortunate gap in the analysis. Scholars whose primary field
is women's rights have generally ignored the possible repercussions
from harassment. Schools, the court announced, "are required to give male and
female students equivalent levels of protection." Id. at 456.
9 WIs. STAT. § 111.36(1)(d)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2000).
10 Tanner v. Oregon Health Sci. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. App. 1998).
" Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/-
50/D/488/1992 (1994), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/-
vws488.htm. The Human Rights Committee, an international body created under
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), held that the Tasmanian Criminal Code provisions outlawing private
consensual contacts between adult homosexual men was a violation of the
ICCPR, as a violation of privacy and the ICCPR's equal protection mandate,
because the laws discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. But see
Case C-249/96, Grant v. Southwest Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.J. CELEX LEXIS
6505 (1998) (rejecting the sex discrimination argument on the ground that the
limitation of certain benefits to married persons treated men and women equally).
See generally Robert Wintemute, Recognising New Kinds of Direct Sex
Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress Codes, 60 MOD.
L. REV. 334 (1997).
12 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Samuel A.
Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1 (1992); Francisco Valdes,
Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995).
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for sex discrimination law of using that claim in sexual orientation
cases, with the prominent exception of Sylvia Law, who wrote the
first major article on the topic. 3 I want to initiate discussion of
the possible reverberations for feminist law, as well as for lesbian,
gay, bisexual and transgender ("LGBT") rights law.
I am going to discuss these cases in terms of the leading
paradigms of sex discrimination law. Because I want to focus on
constitutional concepts of equality, my most frequent example will
be marriage law, where the argument has been most fully devel-
oped. I am not going to address claims arising under anti-discrimi-
nation statutes, such as the harassment cases.
My beginning point will be the two primary conceptualizations
of sex discrimination: formal equality theory and anti-subordination
theory. 14 Both of these theoretical approaches have been invoked
in the scholarship concerning the use of sex discrimination
arguments in LGBT cases, and either is sufficient to sustain a
finding that sex discrimination exists. In turn, such rulings in
LGBT rights cases are likely to have a significant impact on
understandings of how law operates to subordinate women.
Ultimately, though, I am going to argue that neither approach
is culturally sufficient to meet the objections of those who assert
that the sex discrimination argument is a doctrinal sleight of hand
when used to challenge sexual orientation discrimination. To fully
answer those objections, one must address the issues that arise in
the context of what I will call definition theory. Definition theory
is the most provocative of the approaches to these overlapping
areas. Because of its provocative nature, definition theory is the
least useful in litigation, but also the most powerful in its potential
cultural impact.
"3 Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 187 (1988).
" See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861
(1997). For simplicity's sake, I am combining two of Abrams' categories -
difference theory and dominance theory - into anti-subordination theory.
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I. FORMAL EQUALITY THEORY
Formal equality is considered the old, boring version of civil
rights law. Critics have attacked it for its superficiality and
formalism; 5 and despite its usefulness in removing explicit legal
barriers for women, it is rarely described positively in feminist
scholarship.' 6 In fact, claims of sex discrimination in gay rights
cases may be the only realm in which formal equality theory still
has any real intellectual kick.
For an analysis of using sex discrimination arguments in gay
rights cases, the starting point for formal equality claims is Loving
v. Virginia, 7 the case which held that anti-miscegenation laws
were unconstitutional. In Loving, the Court ruled that laws
prohibiting intermarriage violated the Equal Protection Clause
because they were based on a racial classification. This, the Court
said, was per se impermissible - absent a compelling state interest
- even if the law operated to bar certain acts both for whites and
for persons of color.
In gay marriage cases, courts adopting a formal equality
analysis substitute the word "sex" for the word "race" in a critical
passage from Loving, so that, rewritten, it becomes:
"5 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955 (1984); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1279 (1987).
16 For a rare endorsement, see Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the
Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect
Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1447 (2000) (proposing that formal equality, or
anti-differentiation, is an attractive principle, even though it is less fashionable
today than the alternate anti-subordination principle, because formal equality does
not lead to the separate-but-equal thinking that results from applying the anti-
subordination principle, as evidenced by Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 565 (1996)). A similar
disjuncture between equality theories that are successful in litigation and those
most favored by scholars occurs in LGBT cases between arguments grounded in
more individualist notions of rights and those proceeding from a group rights
approach. Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality
and Antisubordination Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 867,
870 (2000).
17 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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[W]e reject the notion that the mere 'equal application' of
a statute containing [sex] classifications is enough to
remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's proscriptions of all invidious discrimination. . . . In
the case at bar, ... we deal with statutes containing [sex]
classifications, and the fact of equal application does not
immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of
justification which the Fourteenth Amendment has tradi-
tionally required of state statutes drawn according to
[sex]. 18
Thus by analogy, Loving stands for the proposition that but for the
partner's sex, the individual could marry her or him. The same
move leads to a similar conclusion as the discriminatory impact of
criminal laws that prohibit sodomy only between same sex
partners: "the distinction between legal and illegal conduct [is] not
the act, but rather the sex of one of the participants."19 On this
understanding, the sex-based classification per se is the equality
violation.
This theory of equality formed the basis for the Hawaii
Supreme Court's ruling that the marriage law amounted to
discrimination based on sex"° and for the invalidation of the Texas
state sodomy law by the Texas Court of Appeals. 2' Yet there have
always been two problems lurking in the heart of formal equality
doctrine about sex. They both manifest themselves in the sexual
orientation cases generally and the marriage cases specifically.
The first major problem for formal equality doctrine arises if
the two groups in question are not considered similarly situated.
For men and women, the argument has always been that commen-
surability is lacking because of biological difference. In the early
1970s, faced with the argument that "natural" differences justified
a wide range of barriers to women, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then
head of the ACLU Women's Rights Project, flipped the meaning of
18 Id. at 8.
'9 Lawrence v. Texas, No. 14-99-00109-CR, 2000 WL 729417, *3 (Tex.
App., June 8, 2000).
20 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 81-82 (Haw.), recons. granted in part, 875
P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
2 Lawrence, 2000 WL 729417, at *4.
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biology in her arguments to the Court in Reed v. Reed22 and
Frontiero v. Richardson.23 She argued that the immutability of the
sex characteristic and the individual's lack of control over it made
using it to justify inferior treatment all the more invidious and
unfair.24 Ginsburg "had effectively taken what had previously
been the greatest weakness of equal protection arguments against
sex-based classifications and made it the center of the case. 25
Ginsburg's move was a masterful litigation stroke, but it also
left unchallenged - indeed, it strengthened - the link between
sexual difference and biology. Her argument forced the Court to
examine more closely the legal barriers to individual women who
sought the opportunity to disprove a generalization based on their
female status, but left open the continued reliance on biological
norms in cases involving sex and reproduction, arenas where
seemingly no woman could escape the "rule" of nature, at least as
the courts interpreted that rule.26
22 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
23 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
24 See, e.g., Brief for Appellant, at 5, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No.
70-430). Ginsburg began her appeal with an argument that sex, like race,
deserved "suspect classification" status because sex and race shared many of the
same characteristics:
Although the legislature may distinguish between individuals on the
basis of their need or ability, it is presumptively impermissible to
distinguish on the basis of an unalterable identifying trait over which
the individual has no control and for which he or she should not be
disadvantaged by the law. Legislative discrimination grounded on sex,
for purposes unrelated to any biological difference between the sexes,
ranks with legislative discrimination based on race, another congenital,
unalterable trait of birth, and merits no greater judicial deference.
Id.
25 Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA. L. REv. 1375,
1453 (1999).
26 See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469
(1981) (holding that as long as the rule of nature that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances is realistically reflected in a gender classifica-
tion, the statute will be upheld as constitutional; here, a California statutory rape
law was found constitutional because the gender classification realistically
reflected that females bear all of the risk of pregnancy); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 494-95 (1974) (holding that the rule of nature that women, unlike men,
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The manipulability'of biology-based arguments is evident in the
opposite uses, depending on outcome, to which they can be put. In
women's rights cases, courts have justified different treatment based
on a finding of "real" difference, most often involving pregnancy.
In the gay marriage cases, courts have justified different treatment
because of the absence of biological difference, on the theory that
the institution of marriage requires difference.27 In other words,
the biological difference between sexes has been invoked to create
an exemption from the equality mandate in pregnancy cases and a
prerequisite for it in gay marriage cases.
Judicial reliance on (what judges perceive as) biology reflects
and reinscribes a deep naturalization of gender. Thus, when courts
like the Hawaii Supreme Court reject the argument that marriage
is necessarily only male-female, they are undermining the kind of
essentialism that has been most harmful to women. Even simple
formal equality claims in gay marriage cases can provide a
powerful lift out of some of the essentialist boxes used to hold
back women, because they interrogate deeply embedded notions of
gender.
One can see the dynamics of the naturalization of gender in the
text of now Justice Ginsburg's opinion in the VMI case:
are susceptible to the risk of disability resulting from normal pregnancy does not
require a state disability insurance program to cover this condition because the
Equal Protection Clause does not require a state to choose between attacking
every risk of disability versus not attacking disability problems at all); see also
Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985). The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act established protection for pregnant women in the
realm of employment, but not, for example, in family law or criminal law. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000). Thus, Geduldig is still good law as an interpretation
of the Constitution. Even the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has not always
proven reliable in eliminating differential treatment of pregnant women. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987). But see Int'l
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
The Court's most recent engagement with the constitutionality of a
pregnancy-linked classification ended inconclusively, when the Court found no
standing for the party challenging an immigration law that treated children born
to unmarried parents differently depending on whether the father or mother was
a U.S. citizen. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
27 See, e.g., Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69 (Bums, J., concurring).
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Supposed 'inherent differences' are no longer accepted as
a ground for race or national origin classification [citing
Loving]... Physical differences between men and women,
however, are enduring... 'Inherent differences' between
men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain
cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual's opportunity.28
The text of this passage moves from "inherent differences" as a
discredited basis for certain classifications, to "physical differences"
between the sexes, and back to "inherent differences., 29 Are the
two terms synonymous? Is this a sly way to exclude psychological
differences from the final phrase, which was largely the basis for
VMI's argument that women were naturally unfit to be cadets at a
co-education facility?30 Exactly which differences are we to
celebrate? Is this a euphemism for heterosexuality? For female
bonding? Doesn't the last sentence incorporate two contradictory
principles: that these inherent differences, as contrasted to racial
ones, are proper grounds for classification - but not for "artificial"
constraints on an individual?
Indeed, the Loving analogy helps to obscure that contradiction,
since it is based on an analogy to race, the realm where indisput-
ably there is no place for a separate but equal doctrine. The Court's
decision in Loving signaled that the repudiation of separate but
equal, which the court began in Brown v. Board of Education,3'
was complete. That consensus has not formed as to gender, as to
which there is still substantial support for separate institutions. For
gender, unlike race, the cultural orthodoxy is difference. What
28 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
29 Id.
30 See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1432-35 (W.D. Va.
1991) (listing in detail the evidence presented by VMI during trial, arguing that
the "Gender-Based Physiological Differences" and the "Gender-Based Develop-
mental Differences" between male and female students were appropriate reasons
for limiting VMI to an all-male educational facility); see also Amy H. Nemko,
Single-Sex Public Education After VMI: The Case for Women's Schools, 21
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 44-45 (1998).
3' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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would be the philosophy comparable to race - gender blindness -
is not widely accepted in the culture.
Gender is most naturalized in the realm of sexuality. Same-sex
marriage cuts to the heart of that naturalization in a very powerful
and visible way.12 Recognition of same-sex marriage would call
into question the law in women's rights cases, which have turned
on an acceptance of the inevitability of sex roles in sex. Often such
cases have permitted the differential treatment of pregnancy, or of
women because of the possibility of pregnancy. 33 Although
heterosexual couples can reject sex roles in sex, the plausibility that
such rejection occurs is more socially visible when same-sex
couples are involved. Nonetheless, the potential is that acceptance
of same-sex marriage would strengthen the consciousness in cases
involving heterosexual women that such roles are not inevitable
and ordained by nature.
II. ANTI-SUBORDINATION THEORY
The second problem with the formal equality model is that it
ignores power. Discrimination against men really is not the same
evil as discrimination against women, and one would say the same
as to "reverse discrimination" against whites, for example. In both
examples, the core of the problem is not the absence of abstract
equality but the presence of subordinating systems of power.34
Anti-subordination theory speaks to this: sex discrimination not
only classifies, it subordinates a class.
This concept of dominance has been the focus of almost all of
the scholarship and almost none of the judicial decisions in the gay
rights cases where plaintiffs have asserted a sex discrimination
32 1 developed this argument in Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender:
A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9 (1991).
33 See supra note 26 (discussing pregnancy in the sex discrimination
context).
34 See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003 (1986) (arguing that, compared to the anti-
differentiation perspective, anti-subordination better explains much of the equal
protection doctrine's history and case law, as well as the aversion felt toward race
and sex discrimination).
406
GAY RIGHTS CASES
claim. First Sylvia Law35 and then Andrew Koppelman 36 articu-
lated the argument that anti-gay discrimination subordinates women
by its reinforcement of gender normative stereotypes about proper
male and female behavior. Koppelman's article specifically
answered the argument that reliance on the surface level analogy
to Loving is insufficient because the Court there did not rely simply
on the law's creation of a racial distinction; it held that the
distinction did not in fact apply equally to all races, but was framed
to enforce a code of white supremacist preservation of a "superior"
race.37 Koppelman argued that a similar enforcement of male
supremacy lay behind the prohibition of homosexuality.38 No
judge has taken up that argument as part of the analysis of a gay
rights case, but Justice Johnson's opinion in Baker v. Vermont
provides a suggestive first step. 9
The standard example in a formal equality approach of how the
sex discrimination argument operates is that a court imagines two
persons of the same sex; let us call them Thelma and Louise.
Either can marry a man, but neither can marry the other. Because
neither wants to marry a man and they are barred from marrying
each other, they suffer discrimination based on the sex of their
partner.4 °
Justice Johnson used a version of this standard story, but one
which can be read to illustrate a subtle but significant shift in the
narrative. As Justice Johnson framed the example, Dr. A and Dr.
B both want to marry Ms. C. Dr. A is male; Dr. B is female. "The
statute disqualifies Dr. B from marriage solely on the basis of her
35 Law, supra note 13.
36 Koppelman, supra note 12; see also, J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of
Status, 106 YALE L. J. 2313, 2361-64 (1997).
3' Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see also Koppelman, supra
note 12, at 222-26.
38 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 234-57.
3' Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 898 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concur-
ring).
4 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND.
L.J. 1, 18 (1994) (discussing how the courts have viewed bans on same-sex
marriage as sexual orientation discrimination, and not sex discrimination).
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sex and treats her differently from Dr. A, a man. This is sex
discrimination.'
What is slightly different about this framing is that there is a
third person in the imaginary construct, Ms. C, who is presumably
choosing between Dr. A and Dr. B. This scenario has a different
resonance than the more familiar story of two women who are
simply excluded from the institution of marriage. In my reading of
Justice Johnson's version, the social force of law is not simply to
exclude based on sexual orientation or to penalize Dr. B., but to
produce heterosexuality. One imagines that Ms. C could go either
way. If she wants to marry, however, she must choose Dr. A.
Implicit in the example is that the harm is in the social coercion of
Ms. C and in the forcible imposition of heteronormativity.42
Justice Johnson sees the limitation to opposite-sex marriage as
a vestige of the "sex-role stereotyping" that pervaded marriage law
prior to feminist legal reforms, citing enforced economic dependen-
cy and the treatment of married women as legal incompetents as
examples.43 Again, one can see the point as not merely discrimi-
natory treatment, but the role of the law of marriage as a major
engine of coercion for almost all women. Under an anti-subordina-
tion theory as well as a formal equality theory, one can trace a
clear link between how classifications based on sex have produced
social regulation of women as well as of non-heterosexuals.
To some extent, this link appears self-evident in everyday life.
We all know that eliminating discriminatory laws opens up new
4" Baker, 744 A.2d at 906.
42 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 800
(1989).
13 Baker, 744 A.2d at 908 (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson offered
numerous examples of a woman's dependence on her husband:
Under the common law, husband and wife were one person. The legal
existence of a woman was suspended by marriage; she merged with
her husband and held no separate rights to enter into a contract or
execute a deed. She could not sue without her husband's consent or be
sued without joining her husband as a defendant. Moreover, if a
woman did not hold property for her "sole and separate use" prior to
marriage, the husband received a freehold interest in all her property,
entitling him to all the rents and profits from the property.
Id. (citations omitted).
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life possibilities and creates subtle shifts in perception. Changes in
the popular language of marriage mark that evolution: from the
traditional terms of "husband and wife" - or even, "man and wife"
- that once were universal; to the now common gender neutral
word, "spouses;" to the increasingly widespread use of the term
that originated with lesbian and gay couples, "partners."
Nonetheless, there is much resistance to the full elaboration of
the gender discrimination argument. If anti-gay discrimination is so
harmful to women, for example, one might ask why more women's
rights organizations have not been highlighting this argument. All
of the feminist organizations support a right to gay marriage, and
many have played supportive roles in the litigation.' But one has
no sense that anyone, including them, feels like this is their
argument. Granted, any claim is more radical when it touches
homosexuality, but many sex discrimination cases involve gender
normative stereotypes. Is there a reason beyond political hesitancy
that this argument has so much difficulty acquiring traction on the
ground?
To many people, including many feminists, the sex discrimina-
tion argument in gay rights cases seems too clever by half. For
some, that is because it seems to be a dodge around what they
sense is really going on, which is the subordination of homosexual-
ity.45 For many married women, it apparently is highly implausi-
ble to believe that legalizing same-sex marriage will have any
impact on opposite-sex marriage. Among my straight women
students, for example, most support gay marriage out of a sense of
solidarity with another oppressed group. To their credit, it is a
4 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae National Organization for Women Legal
Defense and Education Fund, National Center for Lesbian Rights and Equal
Rights Advocates, Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
4' This is the argument made from the opposite policy perspective by the
dissenting judge in Lawrence. Lawrence v. Texas, No. 14-99-00109-CR, 2000
WL 729417, *5 (Tex. App., June 8, 2000) (Hudson, J., dissenting). "Although
[complainants] have attempted to frame their challenge ... in terms of gender
discrimination, their true ground for complaint is that the statute criminalizes
certain homosexual conduct that, in a heterosexual setting, would be perfectly
legal." Id. at 7.
409
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
purely altruistic position. They appear to have no sense that it will
do anything for them.
Critics argue that the exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage does not harm women as a class, but gay people as a
class. Bill Eskridge points out that the same argument could have
been made for anti-miscegenation laws.46 Those laws had a direct
effect only on the mixed-race couples who wanted to marry, not on
all African-Americans. Furtherance of the white supremacist
ideology that the laws embodied was an indirect effect. Eskridge
ultimately returns to the Koppelman thesis, arguing that dominance
theory works if the subordination is indirect as well as direct. 7
Edward Stein has responded to Eskridge and others, asserting
that the sex discrimination argument is sociologically, theoretically
and morally mistaken. 48 Stein asserts that relying on a sex dis-
crimination theory in a gay marriage case is to ignore the primary
basis for the discrimination: homophobia. He analogizes it to a sex
discrimination challenge to anti-miscegenation laws, which could
be premised on the understanding that "a significant purpose of
such laws was to protect white women from black men," but which
would misidentify the disadvantaged class (by asserting that it was
women) and the belief system underlying the law (by focusing on
sexism rather than racism). 49
There is, however, a crucial distinction between using a sex
discrimination argument in the anti-miscegenation cases and using
one in the gay marriage cases. The statute at issue in Loving
explicitly discriminated based on race. Although I would agree with
Stein that sex and race are deeply interconnected in U. S. culture,
the law on its face did not draw a sex-based distinction. It could
have; a legislature could have chosen to specify differential
penalties when an inter-racial marriage involved black men and
46 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 220-21 (1999).
41 Id. at 221.
48 Edward Stein, Sexual Orientation and the Law: A Critique of Two
Arguments for Lesbian and Gay Rights, in HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 43-53 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., forthcoming
2001) (copy on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
49 Id. at 43.
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white women, for example. Although that might have been the
deepest fear of white legislators, they did not incorporate that
distinction into those statutes.
In the gay marriage cases, on the other hand, the explicit
classification drawn by the statutes is one of sex. Although the
arguments used to justify the statutes might be homophobic, the
legislators have not chosen to classify based on sexual orientation.
The unlikelihood that they will - the improbability of states
adopting laws that prohibit homosexual persons from marrying -
speaks to the deeply imbricated nature of sex and sexual orienta-
tion. Legislators may well understand their actions as penalizing
homosexuals rather than women, and especially as penalizing open
homosexuality, but the fact that what seems the most direct and
obvious mechanism for doing so is a distinction based on sex
rather than sexual orientation illustrates how this situation is
different from that of Stein's hypothetical sex discrimination
challenge to anti-miscegenation laws.
It is also worth pointing out that, however favored by progres-
sive scholars, anti-subordination theory is not the law. The anti-
subordination language of Loving was dicta;5" the reliance on
color-blindness and formal neutrality in constitutional jurisprudence
has increased, not decreased, since that decision.5' If courts were
to assert the inadequacy of anti-subordination reasoning as a
doctrinal bar to sex discrimination claims in gay marriage cases,
that rationale would reek of intellectual dishonesty.
Most significant for women as a class, rather than LGBT
people as a class, is the function of sex-based distinctions to
produce and enforce norms that privilege masculinity. Although
50 The Court held that use of an explicit racial classification was sufficient
to find the law unconstitutional. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10-11.
"' See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,"
44 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1991) (detailing the modem Court's progression from the
explicit recognition of racial differences in cases like Brown v. Board of
Education, where the Court endorsed the distinction to right a prior wrong; to the
modem Court's more explicit attempts to adopt a purely race-neutral approach,
rejecting any law relying on any types of racial classifications, even those
establishing corrective elements, such as affirmative action).
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such norms may also constrain some men, what matters for
purposes of this analysis is that they constrain all women.
III. DEFINITION THEORY
Gender-linked stereotypes about sexuality are not just about
behavior. They are about what people perceive as definition, and
that definition turns on the naturalness and the thoroughness of
male-female difference. Thus there is some truth to the trope of the
early gay marriage cases that the claim could not succeed because
of the very definition of marriage. The use of sex discrimination
arguments in these gay rights cases profoundly challenges the
definition of gender, and will inevitably resonate in women's rights
cases.
I think that there are two logics possible for answering the
definition argument directly. The first, which I reject, is to argue
that heterosexual sexual behavior itself is intrinsically determined
by gender roles. Sexuality is a knowledge/power system that is
gendered and through which gender flows, but I do not believe that
sexual practices are a simple function of gender. The social
organization and understanding of sexual practices cannot be
reduced to a function of gender.52
The other logical response, which I embrace, is what I will call
definition theory. It is precisely the act of defining male and
female, masculinity and femininity, which inscribes gender.5 3
Koppelman discussed the function of gender polarities in perpetuat-
ing a dominance system, noting that polarities enable hierarchy.54
Definition theory takes that point deeper. It is in the process of
definition that the difference is constructed.
52 See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics
of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267-
319 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
" See, e.g., ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL
THEORIES ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN passim (1989) (studies from biology);
THOMAS LAQUEUR, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO
FREUD passim (1992) (studies from history); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 6-7 (1990) (cultural studies).
14 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 202, 234-38.
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Katherine Franke has most fully developed this idea as it
applies to the operations of law." Franke argues that the process
of definition, "[t]he authority to define particular categories or
types of people and to decide to which category a particular person
belongs," is a social practice that reflects dominant power struc-
tures, not self-evident facts of nature.56 In the realm of sex
distinctions, she examines a series of cases that turn on an
"ideology of sexual difference," 57 despite apparently contradictory
facts.58 Her conclusion is that "[b]iology is both a wrong and
51 See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law:
The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1995).
56 Id. at 3.
57 Id.
" Franke describes a number of seemingly inconsistent rulings, including the
following:
In Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83 (1970), an English court was asked to
determine whether or not April Ashley was a woman at the time of her marriage
to Arthur Corbett, a man. Born a man, but having undergone a successful sex-
reassignment surgery, Ms. Ashley had 'remarkably good' female genitals," had
female hormonal levels, and "passed easily as a woman." Franke, supra note 55,
at 45. Yet, at all times, she had male chromosomes; thus, the court determined,
"an individual's sex is permanently fixed at birth and cannot be later changed.
.. " Franke, supra note 55, at 46. In deciding that Ms. Ashley was, at the time
of the marriage, "a man," the court noted plainly: "these submissions, in effect,
confuse sex with gender. Marriage is a relationship which depends on sex and
not on gender." Franke, supra note 55, at 47.
In City of Columbus v. Zanders, 266 N.E.2d 602 (Ohio Mun. 1970), in the
context of criminal sumptuary laws, a Columbus, Ohio, court convicted a pre-
operative male to female transgendered person who was arrested three times for
dressing as a woman. Zanders was fulfilling part of his pre-operative therapy.
The court upheld the conviction, although noting that the sumptuary laws
operated to reinforce gender norms, on the ground that the law prevented the
cross-dresser from perpetrating a fraud on the general public. Franke, supra note
55, at 66. A year later, however, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down the same
statute for lack of a scienter requirement. City of Columbus v. Rogers, 324
N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1975); Franke, supra note 55, at 68. The removal of the law
permitted a biological male such as Zanders to appear publicly as a woman.
And in Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), the court was
asked to allow the plaintiff, a woman, access to the Citadel, an exclusively male
military college. The court considered that there were "some real differences
between men and women," and thus there were some legitimate reasons for
accommodating those differences. Id. at 563. The court focused, however, not on
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dangerous place to ground antidiscrimination law because it fails
to account for the manner in which every sexual biological fact is
meaningful only within a gendered frame of reference."'5 9
Janet Halley has made a comparable point about the definition
of sexual orientation and the roles of law in constructing and
enforcing homo- or heterosexuality. 60 Halley points out that the
legal definition of homosexuality changes depending on context; as
one moves from sodomy law discourse to adoption laws to military
regulations, the same individual might be first defined into, then
out of, the category of homosexual.6' In some instances (but not
others), the disjuncture between gender role behavior and anatomi-
62cal sex is determinative. 2 In the gay marriage cases, those
constitutive forces of law - the construction of sex and of sexual
orientation - converge.
I will admit that the phrase "definition theory" is provocative,
perhaps unnecessarily so. Either of the other approaches is
doctrinally sufficient to sustain a sex discrimination claim, and this
is the most controversial framing of a justification. I use it to
intentionally invoke what opponents of gay marriage have relied on
as their primary argument, the assertion that the very definition of
any "real" differences - meaning biological or even gender-based. Rather, the
court focused on the need for privacy in public restrooms. Franke's response:
"Yet there are no significant differences in male and female anatomy that require
separate and distinct sanitary facilities. Although privacy may be an important
cultural value, it is not a 'real difference' of the kind courts demand when it
requires that separate facilities be justified by real and demonstrative differenc-
es." Franke, supra note 55, at 82. Ultimately, however, the court held for the
plaintiff, and Shannon Faulkner entered the Citadel. Faulkner, 858 F. Supp. at
569.
59 Franke, supra note 55, at 98.
60 Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Toward Equal Protection for
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 948-56 (1989); Janet
E. Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET:
QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 82-102 (Michael Warner ed., 1993).
6' Halley, The Politics of the Closet, supra note 59, at 948-56.
62 See Patricia Klein Lerner, Jailer Learns Gay Culture to Foil Straight
Inmates' Crime, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at B1 (describing the process of
segregating gay inmates in a men's prison in Los Angeles to protect them from
the general prison population, and guarantee them the same rights and privileges
of other prisoners).
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marriage requires an opposite-sex couple. The point is not whether
marriage has always been understood to be defined that way,63 or
even that the definition relies on an impermissible classification, as
"voter" once was defined as white or male. The more fundamental
claim is that current marriage law actively creates and enforces
gender hierarchy by constructing the social meaning of male-female
difference.64 Although Franke does not invoke marriage as an
example of her theory, in many respects it is the prime example of
''an ideology of sexual difference."
An argument that marriage can exist without sexual difference
implies that gender polarity is not essential for a (perhaps the)
primary social unit. Such dispensability indicates that gender's
perceived salience and importance have been more the product of
social structures and processes than of biology or nature. That
notion can be simultaneously discomforting and liberatory for
women (as well as for men).
Perhaps in part as a result of the ambivalence among women,
a curious divergence is developing between judicial reasoning and
social perception in the LGBT cases decided on sex discrimination
grounds. Despite holdings based on a finding of sex discrimination,
the rulings are accepted (to the extent that they are) and described
in popular media as being about "gay rights." The problem with
this development is not only that the courts duck a confrontation
with the anti-gay animus which is at work, as discussed supra, but
the potential liberatory impact of such rulings is sharply truncated.
The primary challenge, therefore, may be to feminist rights
advocates: to claim the full meaning of such rulings and to
interpret them socially, as well as legally, as victories for women.
CONCLUSION
As long as there is no federal statutory protection65 or height-
63 For a strong argument that this belief is incorrect, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15-44 (1996).
64 See Hunter, supra note 32.
65 See Steven A. Holmes, Civil Rights Dance Lesson: The Tiny Step
Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at D5 (reporting on a Senate vote resulting
in the defeat of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would have
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ened constitutional scrutiny for sexual orientation claims,66
lawyers will continue to press the sex discrimination argument in
LGBT cases. Whether conceptualized as formal equality, anti-
subordination or definition theory arguments, sex discrimination
claims in LGBT rights cases will have major ramifications for
"traditional" sex discrimination claims brought by women to
challenge policies preferring men. Here, necessity is the mother of
re-invention. And the possibility of re-inventing our understanding
of what sex discrimination means is both a risk and an opportunity
for women's rights advocates.
provided federal employment protections for lesbians and gay men).
66 See Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45
(1996); see also Kyle C. Velte, Paths to Protection: A Comparison of Federal
Protection Based on Disability and Sexual Orientation, 6 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 323 (2000).
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